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Five Georgia Law professors
examine the state’s new tort legislation
In February, after several years of debate, the Georgia General Assembly
enacted a comprehensive set of tort reform provisions. This fairly complex body
of legislation contains 16 separate sections dealing with procedure, evidence and
substantive tort issues. Shortly after it was signed into law, five Georgia Law
professors sat down with alumni and students to describe parts of the new
legislation, to identify some issues that are likely to arise as the new laws go into
effect and to speculate about what they think the likely impact will be on
litigation. The following will provide you with summaries of their remarks.

ney’s fees and costs ...” (O.C.G.A. 9-11-68(d)(1) (emphasis added)).
Presented in March to attendees of the Joseph Henry
Without going into the math, the important point is these inconLumpkin Society Educational Seminar Series (reserved for
sistent and confusing provisions will produce different triggering
annual Georgia Law donors of $1,000 or more and their
amounts.
guests) in Atlanta and to law students at a forum on campus.
The imposition of fees and costs is mandatory if the “trigger” is

Offers of Judgment by
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Associate
Professor of Law
Until the enactment of O.C.G.A. 911-68, Georgia was one of only a handful of states that did not provide for
offers of judgment. Most states’ “offer
of judgment” rules are modeled after
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The
purpose for “offer of judgment” rules
is to encourage the early settlement of
cases, which in turn helps conserve judicial resources.
Many lawyers and commentators, however, are of the opinion
that Rule 68-type offers of judgment do not provide a very meaningful incentive for assuring attainment of this goal because they only
create the potential for the recovery of litigation costs. As a result,
some state provisions also permit the awarding of certain special fees,
such as expert witness fees, in addition to typical costs. And, a relatively small number of states have gone even further by allowing for
the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees – Georgia is now included
in that select group.
Federal Rule 68 may be characterized as moderately confusing,
but it’s “child’s play” compared to Georgia’s new “offer of judgment”
statute, which is extremely lengthy and laden with numerous undefined terms and confusing provisions that will, no doubt, be the
subject of much satellite litigation in the future. Here is a general
description of how it is seemingly supposed to operate.
First, Section 9-11-68 allows for both plaintiffs and defendants to
make “offers of judgment” – not just defending parties, as provided
for in Federal Rule 68. Offers may not be made before 30 days have
elapsed from the date of service of the summons and complaint in
an action, and may not be made less than 30 days before the date
of trial (or 20 days before trial if it is a counteroffer). Once an offer
is made (in writing), the offeree has 30 days within which to accept
(in writing).
If the offeree rejects the offer, or otherwise fails to accept it within
the specified time period, he or she may be on the hook for the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred after the date the offer was
deemed to have been rejected.
Under what specific circumstances will such fees and costs be
recoverable? Unfortunately, this aspect of the statute contains conflicting language that suggests two possible approaches for answering
this all-important “triggering” question.
Subsection (b) provides that: “... if the offeree rejects or does not
accept the offer and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree was
not at least 25 percent more favorable than the last offer, the offeree
shall pay the offeror’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred
after the rejection of the last offer” (O.C.G.A. 9-11-68(b) (emphasis
added)).
Subsection (d)(1), on the other hand, indicates that if a court
determines that: “... the offer of judgment was 25 percent more favorable than the monetary award, the court shall award reasonable attorSpring/Summer 2005

satisfied, and a timely motion is made. But, there is one significant
proviso with regard to the operation of the statute - the trial judge
has been granted discretion to disallow an award of fees and costs
that is technically called for under the terms of the statute, if the
court determines that the offer was not made in “good faith” (which
is not defined).
There is also one additional component to the offer of judgment
statute that has absolutely nothing to do with offers of judgment.
Section 9-11-68(e) allows for the prevailing party, at the time of
the verdict or judgment, to request the “finder of fact” to determine
whether the opposing party’s claim or defense was frivolous (which is
defined in the statute, but in a very confusing and awkward fashion).
If the request is made, the court is required to conduct a “separate bifurcated hearing” at which the “finder of fact” shall determine
whether the claim or defense was frivolous, and then whether damages should be awarded.
The subsection further provides that these “damages” may include
“reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation” in
addition to any other damages that might be established.
Subsection (e) is very interesting, or perplexing, for a host of
reasons. For one thing, there is already a statute (O.C.G.A. 9-1514) that allows for the recovery of such fees and expenses in civil
litigation under similar circumstances, and Subsection (e) expressly
indicates that a party must choose between the two. As a result, is
Section 9-11-68(e) simply overkill?
In addition, Subsection (e) allows for the possibility that a party,
against whom an award of attorney’s fees and costs can be made
under the “offer of judgment” subsections, could nevertheless obtain
an award of his or her own attorney’s fees and costs (or other damages). This is theoretically possible because one only needs to be a
“prevailing party” in order to seek recovery under this subsection
(e.g., a plaintiff can prevail, but still not satisfy the 25 percent more
favorable requirement).
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Subsection (e) seems to
allow for the “frivolousness” determination to be made by a jury,
rather than the court. The subsection uses the phrase “finder of fact”
rather than “court,” which seems to connote “sometimes jury, sometimes judge.” Thus, in many instances, cases may end with a separate
“mini” jury trial, which obviously has the potential to elongate and
unduly complicate the process, and certainly presents an opportunity
for abuse.

Expert Opinions by Ronald L.
Carlson, Callaway Chair of Law
Emeritus
Few cases of any dimension are tried
without the assistance of at least one, if
not several, expert witnesses.
Georgia’s new legislation cuts broadly across the landscape of expert witness
law.
Not simply restricted to medical
cases, the 2005 statute makes clear it
Advocate
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amends courtroom practice for experts across the board in civil cases
from products liability to contract disputes.
Section 7(a) of the 2005 act provides: “The provisions of this
Code section shall apply in all civil actions.” It goes on to amend
O.C.G.A. 24-9-67 with new language, and then adds a new code
section O.C.G.A. 24-9-67.1.
Mirroring much of Federal Evidence Rule 703, the statute states:
“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to the expert at or before the hearing or trial. If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”
Clearly under new O.C.G.A. 24-9-67.1(a), an expert can rely
upon trustworthy written hearsay. For example, expert A can rely
upon reports from expert B when A testifies. A medical doctor can
give her opinions about a patient based upon her treatment of the
patient as well as a written diagnosis supplied by another doctor, even
though the latter doctor does not testify in the case. An expert in aviation
accidents can rely upon reports of official boards of inquiry in order
for the expert to reach his own conclusions regarding the cause of
an air crash. Such an opinion in Georgia is no longer subject to an
“opinion based on hearsay” objection.
What about indications at other points in the new act that may
seem to be contrary to the foregoing conclusions?
These emanate from Section 7(b) that provides that the expert’s
opinions should be drawn from data “which are or will be admitted
into evidence.” Because this language is at odds with the language
previously quoted from section 7(a), which provision controls?
As I noted earlier, Section 7(a) mirrors federal rule language.
New Georgia Section 7(f) directs courts of this state to draw from
the decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to interpret
the new act.
Since Daubert is based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Georgia legislature seems to intend for local courts to follow federal
expert witness law in areas of questionable interpretation.
Because of the legislation’s apparent desire to align Georgia with
federal practice, a conclusion seems inescapable that the new Statute
7(a) (the federal model) prevails over Statute 7(b)(1) (the old common law pattern).
In qualifying experts under the new act, there are special expert
requirements in medical malpractice actions. The expert must be a
member of the same profession as the defendant doctor. Also, he or
she must have actively practiced the specialty for three of the past five
years or been a teacher of the topic for the same period.
A pretrial hearing on these questions is mandated, upon motion
of a party.
Finally, in civil actions by patients against doctors, any apologies
made by the doctor for bad surgical or medical work shall not be
viewed as party admissions against the physician - Section 6(c).
A lingering question relates to the standard for novel scientific
proof in civil cases. For many years, Georgia practice has been controlled in both civil and criminal cases by the Harper test. Now, civil
case practitioners are directed to the Daubert standard - Section 7(f).
As a result, it may be forcefully argued that Harper has been
replaced by Daubert in product liability, personal injury and other
civil actions.
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Emergency Healthcare
Liability by Thomas A. Eaton,
Hosch Professor of Law
Section 10 of Senate Bill 3 limits liability for emergency room-based
malpractice claims. This provision creates a new Code section, O.C.G.A.
51-1-29.5.
There are three main features of this
legislation. First, the level of culpability
needed to support liability is increased
from negligence to gross negligence. Second, the plaintiff’s burden
of proof is increased from a preponderance of evidence to clear and
convincing evidence. Third, the statute requires certain jury instructions be given in emergency room cases.
Subsection (d) provides the court “shall instruct the jury to consider” whether or not the health care provider had a full medical
history of the patient, whether or not there was a preexisting doctorpatient relationship, the circumstances constituting the emergency,
and the circumstances surrounding the delivery of emergency medical care.
The scope of these new rules may be both broader and more narrow than one might think. They may be broader in the sense that
they apply not only to tort claims arising from emergency medical
care provided in an emergency room, but also to medical care provided in “an obstetrical unit or in a surgical suit immediately following the evaluation or treatment of a patient” in a hospital emergency
room.
The new rules may be narrower in the sense that they are not
triggered unless there is a genuine emergency. The phrase “emergency
medical care” is defined in terms of an acute medical condition and
not merely the location of where the care is provided.
In order to constitute an emergency, “the absence of immediate
medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in placing the patient’s health in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to
bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part”
(O.C.G.A. 51-1-29.5(a)(5)).
Thus, the gross negligence, clear and convincing burden of
proof, and mandatory jury instruction provisions would not apply
to patients who receive medical care in the emergency room, but to
those whose condition satisfies the definition of a bona fide emergency. The limited definition of “emergency medical care” should
prevent this new statute from becoming a de facto immunity in the
unfortunately all too common situation in which poor people receive
non-emergency care in local emergency rooms.
It is ironic, or perhaps tragic, that this legislation provides greater
insulation from tort liability to those claims arising from the single
location of a hospital where negligence is most likely to occur. In
the most far reaching empirical study of treatment-induced injuries
(“adverse events”), researchers from the Harvard School of Public
Health concluded that over 70 percent of adverse events in an emergency room were the result of negligence. O.C.G.A. 51-1-29.5 will
make such claims more difficult to pursue.
Section 11 of Senate Bill 3 substantially eliminates the doctrine of
apparent agency in the hospital setting. For a bit of background, most
physicians are not employees of the hospitals in which they practice.
They are considered independent contractors. Consequently, hospiSpring/Summer 2005

tals are not, as a general matter, vicariously liable for the torts committed by physicians.
An exception to this general rule has been recognized under
Georgia law. Under the doctrine of apparent agency, a hospital can
be rendered vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician if the
physician is deemed to be the “apparent agent” of the hospital.
Apparent agency may be found when the hospital represents that
the doctor is its agent and the patient relies on that representation.
The doctrine of apparent agency is most often invoked in the context
of hospital-based practices, such as emergency rooms, pathology,
radiology and anesthesiology.
Section 11, which will be codified as O.C.G.A. 51-2-5.1, prescribes how a hospital can avoid liability under apparent agency for
these and a number of other health care professionals. However,
the impact of this provision on medical liability may be relatively
limited.
Hospitals remain potentially liable for their own acts of institutional negligence and vicariously liable for the negligence of their
actual agents. Moreover, the physicians who, in the absence of the
statute, might previously have been deemed apparent agents are
subject to liability for their individual acts of negligence. Moreover,
such physicians usually have sufficient insurance or other assets to
provide compensation. Thus, the impact of Section 11 on the ability
of a patient to secure compensation should be minimal.

Venue by C. Ronald Ellington,
Cleveland Chair of Legal Ethics
and Professionalism
What changes in the law governing
venue (where civil actions can be tried)
does the 2005 Georgia tort reform legislation make? Let’s take a simple example:
Suppose a person from Athens-Clarke
County is involved in an automobile
collision with two other motorists from
Fulton County and Cobb County
respectively. The accident happens on I-85 in Gwinnett County.
Where could the plaintiff bring one action against the other two
drivers? Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 3, one could answer
confidently that the plaintiff could sue both the other drivers in
either Fulton or Cobb county if it were alleged their separate, independent acts of negligence combined naturally to cause an indivisible
injury to the plaintiff. This result followed from the provision in
Article 6, Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Georgia Constitution that
reads “suits against joint obligors, joint tort-feasors, joint promisors,
copartners, or joint trespassers residing in different counties may be
tried in either county.”
Suppose the plaintiff selects Fulton County and brings suit
there against both defendants. Under the Constitution, as alleged
joint tortfeasors, venue would be proper as to both. But what if the
resident defendant from Fulton County is dismissed from the action
before trial or a verdict is returned for that defendant but against the
non-resident defendant from Cobb County?
For over 100 years, the answer in Georgia case law was that venue
vanished as to the non-resident defendant. The court lost jurisdiction
to enter a judgment on the verdict against the non-resident defendant only, and the plaintiff would have to re-try the case in Cobb
County where the defendant resides.
Spring/Summer 2005

Six years ago, the General Assembly acted to eliminate what it
described as “the waste of time and resources to courts and parties
under the vanishing venue doctrine.” Old O.C.G.A. 9-10-31(c),
adopted in 1999, effectively ended the possibility that venue would
vanish when a defendant was discharged “after the commencement
of trial” by requiring the consent of all parties (including the victorious plaintiff) before the action could be transferred.
Plainly, the 2005 Tort Reform Act undoes the 1999 statute and
restores vanishing venue in O.C.G.A. 9-10-31(d). Accordingly,
plaintiffs must carefully weigh once again whether the case against
the resident defendant is a strong one, for if the resident defendant is
not held by a judgment, any verdict against a resident of a different
county sued there, because joined with the resident defendant, will
be wasted.
This assumes the two co-defendants from Fulton and Cobb
can still be sued together in the county where either resides in the
first place. Can they today? O.C.G.A. 9-10-31(a) and (b) appear to
assume they can.
But, whether the plaintiff may constitutionally sue them in a
single action is potentially called into question by Section 12 of
Senate Bill 3 dealing with joint and several liability. If, as most readers assume, O.C.G.A. 51-12-31 and 51-12-33(b) eliminate joint
and several liability, then the constitutional underpinning that allows
defendants from Fulton and Cobb counties to be sued together in
one action in either county may be removed.
If these defendants are no longer jointly liable, but only individually liable for their own percentage of fault, then we can expect
nonresident defendants to object to venue when the action is filed
by arguing they are not “joint tortfeasors” and hence each has the
constitutional right under Article 6, Section 2, Paragraph 6 to be
sued in the county of his or her own residence.
Of course, it may be plausible to conclude that even if the two
defendants are no longer jointly liable, they still remain “joint tortfeasors” for the purpose of the constitutional rule so long as their
individual acts of negligence have combined to produce an indivisible injury. But, there is reason for at least some argument on this
score because some Georgia cases can be read to rest the right to sue
joint tortfeasors, joint obligors or copartners residing in different
counties in the county where any one resides on the principle that
they are jointly liable.
Without joint liability, the whole edifice may collapse. Quite
plainly, the fact the Civil Practice Act treats defendants against whom
claims arising from a single collision are asserted as proper parties for
a single action does not mean venue would also be proper. Statutes,
such as the Civil Practice Act, cannot expand or vary the constitutional rules governing venue.
While the legislature can eliminate joint liability for tortfeasors,
one provision in O.C.G.A. 9-10-31 is constitutionally suspect. New
Subsection (c) allows, in medical malpractice actions, a nonresident
defendant to require the case be transferred to the county of that
defendant’s residence if the tortious act giving rise to the lawsuit
occurred in that county.
If the nonresident defendant is a joint tortfeasor with a resident defendant, Article 6, Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Georgia
Constitution provides venue is proper where either defendant
resides. The Supreme Court ruled in Glover v. Donaldson that a statute could not limit the plaintiff’s choice to only one of the counties
Advocate
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in the case of joint tortfeasors. Relying on Glover, the State Court of
DeKalb County ruled in Turner v. Beaird on March 21, 2005, that
O.C.G.A. 9-10-31(c) was thus unconstitutional.
Finally, O.C.G.A. 9-10-31.1 gives Georgia courts authority, for
the first time, to order transfers of civil actions from one county to
another for the convenience of parties or witnesses and in the interest
of justice. Applying factors typically used in forum non conveniens
analysis such as “relative ease of access to sources of proof,” “possibility of viewing the premises when appropriate” and “administrative
difficulties for forum courts,” the statute allows transfer to a “different county of proper venue.” What exactly this means is not free
from doubt. Does “proper venue” mean a county where a plaintiff
has the right to sue or can a defendant create a different county of
proper venue by consent?
Surprisingly O.C.G.A. 9-10-31.1 also substantially duplicates a
2003 statute, O.C.G.A. 50-2-21, which authorizes a Georgia court
to dismiss an action if a more convenient forum exists outside the
state. Whereas, O.C.G.A. 50-2-21 only applies to actions filed on
or after its effective date of July 1, 2003, the provision in O.C.G.A.
9-10-31.1 purports to be applicable to actions already pending when
the new tort reform law became effective on Feb. 16.
Whether the new law authorizing forum non conveniens dismissals or transfers can be applied retroactively to cases already filed is
likely to provoke serious constitutional challenges.

Joint Liability Rules by
Michael L. Wells, Carter Chair in
Tort and Insurance Law
In tort law, the rule of joint liability holds that two or more defendants
who are each causally responsible for a
single “indivisible” injury may be held
“jointly” liable for it. That is, in such a
case, the plaintiff may recover all of his
damages from any of the defendants. At
the same time, the plaintiff is entitled to
only one full recovery. Once he obtains
this, the judgment is satisfied and he gets nothing from anyone else.
Some years ago, the Georgia legislature modified this rule. The
legislature distinguished between cases where the plaintiff was at fault
and cases where plaintiff was not at fault. It abandoned joint liability
in the former situation but not the latter.
In February 2005, the legislature passed a statute that modified
the provisions bearing on joint liability. Some people, including
legislative leaders who were behind the enactment of the new statute,
say the new statute abolishes joint liability altogether.
I think this is a hasty, and probably incorrect, judgment. To begin
with, we need to recall certain basic principles of statutory interpretation. First, it is generally agreed that the aim of statutory interpretation is to carry out the intention of the legislature. There is plenty of
evidence the legislative leaders meant to abolish joint liability, based
on what they said about the legislation. But this seems to me to be
irrelevant, for reasons that are, in part, distinctive to statutory interpretation in Georgia.
Given that, in Georgia, one determines legislative intent by looking at the statute and the history of the statute, i.e., the way it has
been amended over time. One also looks at the common law background of the statute as well as the structure of the statute, i.e., the
18
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way various parts of it relate to one another.
One reason to question the assertion the new statute wholly
abolishes joint and several liability is the statute contains no explicit
language to that effect. The abolitionist argument, then, is the
amendments must implicitly abolish joint liability. But it is far from
clear that the amendments do any such thing.
One section thought to abolish the joint liability rule is the
amendment to O.C.G.A. 51-12-31. This section used to provide,
in relevant part, that “except as provided in Code Section 51-12-33,
where an action is brought jointly against several trespassers, the
plaintiff may recover damages for the greatest injury done by any of
the defendants against all of them.”
Now, it provides that “where an action is brought jointly against
several persons, the plaintiff may recover damages for an injury
caused by any of the defendants against only the defendant or defendants liable for the injury.” Left unchanged are the last two sentences
of Section 31: “In its verdict, the jury may specify the particular
damages to be recovered of each defendant. Judgment in such a case
must be entered severally.”
The new version describes the people one obtains damages against
in the second part rather than the first, where it used to specify “trespassers.” This change has nothing to do with joint liability.
The other change is taking out “the greatest injury done” and “all
of them,” replacing that language with “an injury caused” [by any
of the defendants]. This amendment does not touch joint liability
either.
Joint tortfeasors all cause an indivisible injury. Thus, they are all
covered by the new language just as they were by the old language.
All of them are covered by “only the defendant or defendants liable
for the injury.”
What the amendments do is to remove the confusing suggestion
in the old law that there may only be joint liability against a less
responsible defendant (“the greatest injury done”) for harm done by
a more responsible defendant.
What the language of the new statute does is to make clear that
there is joint liability under the common law rule against all defendants, those who bear responsibility for more of the negligence as
well as those who bear responsibility for less of it.
The other provision that was changed is O.C.G.A. 51-12-33. The
prior version of this is the statute that abolished joint liability when
the plaintiff is at fault. One thing the new statute does is to divide
the old statute up into three parts, with some of its propositions now
appearing in (a), some in (b) and some in (g). The central point is 5112-33 does not address the broad issue of whether joint and several
liability remains the rule in cases where the plaintiff is not at fault.
Another feature of the statute bears on whether it should be interpreted as abolishing joint liability. Nothing was done to O.C.G.A.
51-12-32, the section in between the two we have looked at. That
statute, as interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court, authorizes “pro
rata” contribution among joint tortfeasors. This provision would be a
nullity if there were no joint liability.
If the intent of the legislature was to repeal joint liability, the framers of the statute surely would have repealed Section 32. As matters
stand, the partisans of the “abolition” thesis have to resort to reading
this section as saying “except for [always] the following rules will
apply.” The abolitionist view turns Section 32 into a superfluous passage. Yet, the Georgia Supreme Court avoids constructions that turn
statutory language into “mere surplusage.” ■
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